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IN THE SUPR'EME COURT
:of the

STATE OF UTAH
REMINGTON RAND, INC., a
corporation,
Respondent and Plaimtiff,
vs.
THURMAN E. O'NEIL and LOIS S.
:MACHADO, fdba A-1 TYPEWRITER
COMPANY,
Defendants,

Case No. 8379

vs.
DALE E. GRANT and UTAH CASH
REGISTER EXCHANGE, INC., a
corporation,
Appellants and G.arnishee Defendants.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts of the case as outlined in defendants'
brief are substantially correct, but plaintiff believes it
will aid the Court to better understand the case if further
facts are chronologically stated with reference to the
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manner in which the garnishee defendants, Dale E. Grant
and Utah Cash Register Exchange, Inc., became indebted
to defendant Thurman E. 0 'Neil and the court proceedings that followed.
Thurman E. O'Neil owned and operated business machines outlets in Salt Lake City and Provo, both known
as A-1 Typewriter Company (R. 42). In July of 1954
these businesses were in serious financial condition and
their doors were closed (R. 59). O'Neil, with an apparent
intention of secreting his stock of merchandise, office furniture and equipment from his creditors (R. 60) sought
a method whereby he could dispose of the same without
either he or his tranferee incurring liability under the
Bulk Sales Law of Utah. One Hugh Snyder, an acquaintance of O'Neil's introduced him to the defendant, Dale E.
Grant (R. 43, 80), and a scheme was contrived whereby
a store would be opened in Salt Lake City and the business incorporated under the name, Utah Cash Register
Exchange, Inc., and the business would receive the office
furniture and equipment from O'Neil's Provo store and
make sales of O'Neil's merchandise (R. 45, 46). Five
valuable Sweda Cash Registers had been mortgaged to
the Farmers State Bank at Woods Cross, Utah by O'Neil.
Shortly after commencing his operation, Grant redeemed
the chattel mortgage by payment of approximately $3,000.00 to the bank ( R. 82), using as funds cash which 0'
Neil had obtained through the sale of certain office machines following the closing of his doors in Provo and
Salt Lake City (R. 47, 49, 54). There was no opening
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

inventory taken at the time Utah Cash Register Exchange
began its existence in August, 1954 (R. 84), nor were
there any bills of sale from O'Neil to Grant or Utah
Cash Register Exchange, Inc., covering the merchandise,
furniture and equipment transferred (R. 93, 43). Dale
Grant held 49·5 shares of stock in the corporation, his
wife, P. F. C. Grant, held 3 shares, and his brother-inlaw, R. C. Collard, held the remaining 2 of the 500 shares
authorized (R. 75). Although the business known as Utah
Cash Register, Inc. was, according to public record, a
corporation, Grant, O'Neil and Snyder had already
agreed that they would each contribute to the business
a certain amount of cash (R. 47) and, presumably, share
in its profits. The business venture apparently operated
smoothly until December of 1954 when it becmne evident
that the business would not support Grant, O'Neil and
Snyder (R. 48). In December, O'Neil made demand upon
Grant for a sum in excess of $5,000.00 (R. 49, 50, 51)
which O'Neil contended Grant owed him because of 0'Neil's contribution in cash, merchandise, furniture and
equipment. Grant disputed the ·sum demanded by O'Neil
and conferred with his attorney (R. 51, 61). Upon returning from his attorney's office, Grant announced to
Snyder and one E. F. White, an employee of his company, that he had "whittled him (O'Neil) down to $3650.00." Shortly thereafter O'Neil left the business, and was
never paid any part of the money which Grant had indicated as owing him (R. 52).
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In March of 1955, the attorneys for Remington Rand,
Inc., which company had obtained a default judgment
against O'Neil for $4,243.82 and costs (R. 19), were informed of the above facts. Garnishments were served
on Grant and Utah Cash Register Exchange, Inc. (R. 11,
13), and in their answers Grant stated that he was not
indebted to O'Neil (R. 15), and Utah Cash Register Exchange, Inc. conveniently answered that the furniture
and equipment at Utah Cash Register Exchange, Inc.
was the property of O'Neil and that it claimed no interest in it (R. 16). Remington Rand, Inc. traversed the
garnishees' answers and noticed in the Law and Motion
Division of the District Court for Salt Lake County a
hearing to determine the amount of indebtedne·ss owed
O'Neil by these garnishees. Replies were prepared to the
garnishees' answers and were thought to have been served on both Grant and O'Neil, although the original reply
(R. 34) filed at the Salt Lake County Court House did
not indicate service by mailing or otherwise. It was not
until the garnishee judgment was entered by the District Court against Grant and Utah Cash Register Exc:hange, Inc. that Remington Rand learned, by way of
an affidavit filed in the action (R. 2'5), that Grant allegedly had not received a copy of the reply. The notice
served on Grant calling up the hearing (R. 21) apprised
Grant that plaintiff would attempt to establish his personal liability to O'Neil. A subpoena was served upon
Grant (R. 36) for the express purpose of requiring him
to bring with him to the hearing books and records of
Utah Cash Register Exchange, Inc. which would show
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transactions between Grant and O'Neil during the period
in question. The Court, at the hearing's outset again apprised Grant and his counsel that this would be a hearing
to determine Grant's personal liability to O'Neil as well
as that of the corporation (R. 40, 41), and with Grant
sitting at the side of his aMorney at the counsel table, the
proceedings went forward. Testimony was introduced in
behalf of plaintiff, Remington Rand, and evidence was
introduced by Grant. All witnesses were subjected to
cross examination. The parties rested, arguments of
counsel were heard and the District Court awarded a
judgment in favor of O'Neil and against Dale E. Grant
and Utah Cash Register Exchange, Inc. in the sum of
$3600.00, for the benefit of Remington Rand, Inc. (R. 17).
The Court further announced that it found Utah Cash
Register Exchange, Inc. to be the alter ego of Dale E.
Grant.
Within the next few days Remington Rand wasserved with a notice and motion to vacate and set aside the
garnishee judgment (R. 22), which motion was based on
substantially the same grounds as are argued by appellants on this appeal, and in addition, upon the ground
that plaintiff had failed to prepare Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law. Grant's affidavit was appended to
the motion. At the hearing the Court vacated the judgment on the ground that it was not supported by Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 33), permitted plaintiff to immediately file such papers, and then entered
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judgment nunc pro tunc in substantially the same form
as the original judgment (R. 1). A further motion was
filed by the garnishee defendants requesting that ce1:tain
Findings of Fact be stricken (R. 29). The District Court
considered the Findings and did strike five paragraphs
of the same ·on stipulation of both parties (R. 6). A
notice of appeal to this Court was filed by defendants
on June 6, 195;5 (R. 31).
STATEMENT OF POINT'S
I. APPELLANTS WERE AFFORDED NOTICE SUFFICIENT TO SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW.

II. THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY HAD JURISDICTION OVER
THE DEFENDANTS TO ENTER JUDGMENT IN EXCESS OF
THAT AMOUNT ADMITTED AS OWING IN THE ANSWERS
OF GARNISHEES.
III. EVIDENCE WAS INTRODUCED SUFFICIENT TO
SUPPORT THE FINDING BY THE COURT THAT UTAH
CASH REGISTER EXCHANGE, INC. WAS THE ALTER
EGO OF DALE E. GRANT, BUT THE FINDING WAS NOT,
AT ANY RATE, ESSENTIAL TO SUPPORT THE JUDGMENT
AGAINST GRANT PERSONALLY.

ARGUMENT
I. APPELLANTS WERE AFFORDED NOTICE SUFFICIENT TO SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW.

The plaintiff, at all times prior to the motion of
garnishee defendants to vacate and set aside the judgment, was of the impression that defendant Dale E.
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Grant had a copy of the Reply to Answers of Garnishee'S.
The writer personally placed the replies in envelope·s with
the notices of the hearing to be held April 18, 1955, and
mailed them to Grant and O'Neil, with copies of the notice to their attorneys. But it is submitted that if Grant
did not receive a copy of the reply to answers of garnishees, he should not have proceeded at the hearing, but
should have objected to the procedure at that time as not
giving him opportunity to prepare his case and demand
a jury trial, if he wanted one. The Trial Court specifically informed Grant and his counsel as to what the
hearing was designed to accomplish in the following
words (R. 40):
The Court: "Well, you are not taking anything personally against Mr. Grant."
Mr. Swan: ''Yes, Your Honor, we are. We
have prayed for judgment in the alternative,
either Mr. Grant or the corporation."
The Oourt : "He hasn't been garnished, has
he~"

Mr. Swan: "Yes, I think your file will show
two garnishments, Your Honor, one against the
corporate defendant and one against Grant personally."
The Court: "Oh yes, I see; and what does
he answer personally~ That he owed nothing~"
Mr. Swan: "They both ·answered that they
were not indebted."
The Third Judicial District Court Rules of Practice
effective June 1, 1942 do not outline the procedure that
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1s to be followed in setting for hearing the traverse of
a garnishment. Rule 64 D (h) is sornewhat vague in that
it states, "and the matter thus at issue shall be tried in
the same manner as other issues of like nature." The
Clerk of the District Court informed the writer that the
procedure has been, as long as he recollects, to set the
traverse to a garnishment on the Law and Motion Calendar. It is reasonable that if a party desires to demand
a trial, this demand might be made prior to the date set
for hearing, which would make necessary the setting of
the case on the trial calendar. A demand for trial was
not made in the instant case, although Grant admits he
was served with a notice which stated:
"To the defendant, Thurman E. O'Neil, and
to Dale E. Grant, and Utah Cash Register Exchange, Inc., a corporation, garnishees :
"You will please take notice that on Aprill8,
1955, at two o'clock p.m. plaintiff will call up in
the Law and Motion Division of the above entitled Court a hearing to determine the indebtedness, if any, due Thurman E. O'Neil by the garnishees above."
As to notice of what was to transpire at the hearing,
it is further submitted that the subpoena served on Grant
April 16, 1955, required him to "bring with you check
books on personal accounts showing disbursements in the
past six months; check books on Utah Cash Register Exchange, Inc., accounts showing disbursements in the past
six months; ledger of Utah Cash Register Exchange, Inc.;
cancelled checks showing payments, if any, to Thurman
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E. O'Neil on moneys owed him by Dale E. Grant or Utah
Cash Register Exchange, Inc." It would not require
much thought after reading the quotation above for Grant
to determine that he would be called upon at the hearing
to account as to his personal liability, if any, to O'Neil
as well as the liability of his corporation. The transcript
of the proceeding indicates that the hearing was carried
on after the manner of a trial with opportunity for cros-sexamination and argument. No objection to the procedure was even intimated. It is incredible that the defendants and their counsel could have sat for two hours in
that proceeding and then, in their brief, eontend that "it
was only afterward when appellant and his counsel examined the file that it became fully clear that the appellants had been submitted to an actual trial on the 'Reply
to Answers to Garnishment' which had never been served
on them."
As to the proceeding following the theory as set
forth in plaintiff's reply to answers of garnishees, the
record is clear that the indebtedness of Grant andjor
Utah Cash Register Exchange, Inc. to O'Neil grew out
of a loan by O'Neil of some $3,000.00, and also the value
of the stock of merchandise and equipment transferred in
apparent violation of the Bulk Sales Act of Utah and
contributed to Grant's business. The allegation in defendants' brief that plaintiff's witness E. L. White actually held a bill of sale to the merchandise appellants
actually did have in their possession is true in a sense
only, since E. L. White did not hold a bill of sale, but a
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doctunent entitled bill of sale, taken f'Or security purposes only (R. 67), which clearly should be viewed as a
chattel mortgage. The answer of Utah Cash Register
Exchange, Inc. to the Writ of Garnishment stating that
it "had in its possession items listed in your praecipe of
March 15 subject to a bill of sale in favor of Mr. E. F.
White, apparently for security reasons," is an admission
by defendant that they were aware of the nature of the
document.
It is true that the reply to answers of garnishees
contended Utah Cash Register, Inc. was the alter ego
of appellant Dale E. Grant. The Trial Court so f'Ound.
The portion of the transcript quoted in appellants' brief
wherein the witness 'Snyder was asked: "Q: And did
1\fr. Grant on that occasion state the reason for the incorporation of Utah Cash Register~ A: Well, I presume
limited liability is the understanding that I had out of
the conversation", can mean many things. Plaintiff concedes that limited liability is a legitimate purpose for
incorporation, and that, presumably, all of the stock in
a corporation could be held by one individual and yet
a Court find the corporation a ·separate entity from the
person owning those shares. But the transcript read as
a whole clearly reveals the reason for the incorporation
of Utah Cash Register Exchange. The question of the
sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a finding that Utah
Cash Register Exchange, Inc. was the alger ego of Dale
E. Grant will he discussed hereafter.
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The due process of law provision of Section 7, Article 1, Constitution of the State of Utah, and the provision of the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States do not guarantee to an individual either
a trial by jury ( 67 A.L.R.. 1075, 91 A.L.R. 74) or the opportunity to use the pretrial techniques of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and the Utah Rules which follow them in substance.
The appellants cite 88 A.L.R. 1148 as supporting the
proposition that a garnishment proceeding should be set
on the trial calendar, "particularly if the garnishee demands the same." Plaintiff concedes that if the defendants demand a trial setting it is proper that the same
should be given, but the opportunity was given the defendants in this proceeding to demand a trial setting on
the regular trial calendar and they did nothing.
It is further submitted that the traverse of a garnishment is in the nature of a proceeding supplemental to
judgment. Some courts in this country have ruled that
the garnishees are not entitled to a jury trial because
the nature of a garnishment proceeding is that of a proceeding supplemental to judgment (88 A.L.R. 1148). As
stated in the case of Huntington vs. Bishop, 5 Vermont
186 (1832), "the proceeding against the trustee (garnishee) is a mere incident to the principal suit. This proceeding, as already observed, is a creature of the statute, a
part of the attachment law; and the object of it is mere-
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ly to secure the estate of Spooner (the trustee) to respond to the judgment which may be recovered in the
principal suit."
There is an issue involved in every hearing on an
order for supplemental proceedings, pursuant to Rule 69
(k), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, yet these hearings
are normally set in the Law and Motion Division of the
Court and in many cases, a defendant's rights to ce~tain
property are affected by the determination of the J'udge.
It seems that due process of law is fully met by service
of the notice of the hearing itself, with an opportunity
for cross-examination at the hearing, without the requirement of a notice setting forth the theory on which the
plaintiff intends to proceed at the hearing.
Rule 64 D (h), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, stating that "Judgment shall be entered upon the verdict or
finding the same as if the garnishee had answered according to such verdict or finding," indicates that the
rule contemplates a proceeding in the nature of a trial,
and further, a jury trial, if it is demanded. The plaintiff
does not deny that this is probably a correct construction
of the rule, but, as a complete answer states that the defendants had the opportunity to demand a trial setting,
a jury, and anything further that the Utah Rule's of Civil
Procedure give c'Ontesting parties in a law suit. A reading of the transcript in the light of the contents of papers
that had been served on defendants Grant and Utah Cash
Register Exchange, leave one with the impression that
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Grant, knowing what was to transpire at the hearing on
Aprill8, 1955, waived all of the benefits he now seeks, by
appearing with counsel and submitting to a trial on the
merits. As an afterthought, when a sizeable judgment
is awarded against him, he then seeks to show that he
had no notice of the proceeding. The only thing that can
be complained of is the alleged failure of the plaintiff
to serve Grant with a copy of the reply to answers of
garnishee and the only statement in the record on this
subject is the self-serving affidavit of Grant. His attorney could not be sure to this day whether Grant actually
received a copy of the reply.
II. THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY HAD JURISDICTION OVER
THE DEFENDANTS TO ENTER JUDGMENT IN EXCESS OF
THAT AMOUNT ADMITTED AS OWING IN THE ANSWERS
OF GARNISHEES.

The contention of the defendants that the failure
of plaintiff, if any, to serve the reply upon the garnishees
was jurisdictional falls when it is considered that the
garnishee defendants with their counsel appeared on
the date for hearing and submitted themselves to a
trial on the merits without at any point in the proceeding voicing protest to .the jurisdiction of the District
Court. Grant~s appearance with his attorney and hi's
participation in the garnishment proceeding constituted
a general appearance. The test for determining when
such a general appearance has occurred has been said
to be whether the complaining party has taken any
action "which recognizes the case as in court." Stat,e
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ex rel. Northwestern Coloniza,tion & Improvement Co. of
Chihuahrua vs. Hull, et al., 168 P. 528, (New Mexico,
1917), Rammond, et al vs. District Court of Eighth
Judicial District of New Mexico et al, 228 P. 758 (New
Mexico, 1924). The Supreme Court of Idaho has decided
that participation in a trial by examining and crossexamining witnesses constituted a general appearance.
Poage vs. Co-operative Publishing Co., et 1al., 66 P. 2d
1119, 110 A.L.R. 1322 (1937).
1

The appellants need not have had much foresight
to suppose that what plaintiff was seeking was not a
judgment awarding them the equipment which Grant
had admitted as being on his premises, and which he
conveniently stated was not claimed by Utah Cash Register Exchange, Inc., but rather, to impose additional
liability on the defendants because of an indebtedness
to O'Neil. Pursuant to Rule 64 D (h), "Judgment was
entered upon the finding the same as if the garnishees
had answered according to the finding." The plaintiff
was entitled to, a judgment for such amount as the Court
should find was due and owing O'Neil by the garnishee
defendants, without being limited in any manner by the
answers of the garnishees to the writs.
III. EVIDENCE WAS INTRODUCED SUFFICIENT TO
SUPPORT THE FINDING BY THE COURT THAT UTAH
CASH REGISTER EXCHANGE, INC. WAS THE ALTER
EGO OF DALE E. GRANT, BUT THE FINDING WAS NOT,
AT ANY RATE, ESSENTIAL TO SUPPORT THE JUDGMENT
AGAINST GRANT PERSONALLY.
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The stoek distribution of the corporation (495 shares
to Grant, 2 shares to his brother-in-law and 3 shares to
his wife) admittedly would not, in and of itself, support
the finding, but with a background of the steps that were
taken in order to conceal O'Neil's assets from his creditors and dispose of them through a newly organized
corporation in which O'Neil appeared neither as an
owner or stockholder, the purpose of the organization
of the corporation by Grant can be readily inferred. Consider the following: The transfer of the equipment from
the Provo, Utah store to Utah Cash Register Exchange
was never evidenced by a bill of sale (R. 43, 93). The
amount which Grant or Utah Cash Register Exchange
agreed to pay O'Neil for his contribution in cash and
equipment was never reduced to writing, except for the
notes made by Snyder when requested to arbitrate,
because, according to Snyder, ":Mr. O'Neil had too many
creditors, I believe looking for him at that particular
time to show where he had any assets." (R. 50). There
was no opening inventory taken at the time Utah Cash
Register began its existence, and Snyder indicated that
the reason for taking no inventory was for the same
reason that money owed O'Neil was not reduced to
writing (R. 50). Dale Grant personally helped E. F.
White, Mr. O'Neil and White's brother-in-law transfer
merchandise from the Provo store to Utah Cash Register at 153 East 2nd South, Salt Lake City (R. 59') and
knew O'Neil was insolvent (R. 93). The transfer of
the equipment was made sometime during the month
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of July and the corporation commenced doing business
August 1, 19·54. On direct examination Grant admitted
·that the figure of $3600.00 or thereabouts arrived at as
the figure owed O'Neil by Grant was "high and encompassed so much of it being the equipment." (R. 76).
Clearly Grant intended to pay for the equipment which
he was using in his business, although he disputes the
figure arrived at. It appeared that the valuable Sweda
franchise which O'Neil owned while doing business in
Provo would be lost unless an outlet were found in the
area for the· distribution of Sweda Cash Registers
through a corporation or business entity with O'Neil's
name completely out of the picture (R. 80). At the
start of the busineS's, according to Grant, "we had some
Sweda Cash Registers. * * * I presume they were from
his (O'Neil's) Salt Lake store" (R. 81). On August 4,
shortly after the corporation was organized, Grant redeemed a mortgage at the Woods Cross bank using
$3,000.00 in cash turned over to him by O'Neil, and
which mortgage covered Sweda Cash Registers which
had a valuation in excess of the amount paid to redeem
them. (R·. 81). These Swedas became part of the merchandise sold at Utah Cash Register Exchange, Inc.,
yet no bill of sale or other orderly transfer was made
from O'Neil to Grant. A chattel mortgage covering
certain Sweda Gash Registers previously belonging to
O'Neil was executed to a Mrs. Cottle, which mortgage
was outstanding at the time of the hearing, and the note
supporting such chattel mortgage was signed personally
by Grant, Snyder and O'Neil (R. 92, 99).
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The question whether a corporation should be disregarded depends upon questions of fact. 1 Fletcher on
Corporations, Sec. 41. This Court h'as stated in the case
of Western Securities Company vs. Spiro, 62 Utah 623,
632, 221 P. 8:
"That, under certain circumstances, the legal
entity ·of a corporation must be entirely disregarded was clearly pointed ·out by the Court in the
case first cited above (Louisville Banking Company vs. Eisenman, 94 Ky. 83, 2'1 S.W. 531, 1049).
The courts have had frequent occasion to consider facts and circumstances similar or analagous to those in ·the case at bar, and to ·apply the
law to such facts and circumstances. It would
be a mere travesty of justice if courts could or
should refuse to look behind the mere form ·of a
transaction in order to ascertain the real truth,
and reach and hold responsible the real parties
in interest. * * *
''In the case of First National Bank vs. Treblin Co., 59 Ohio St. 316, 59 N.E. 834, the proposition that a corporate entity may be entirely disregarded in order to reach and protect the real
parties in interest and to disclose the real transaction is well illustrated and applied. See also
In re l\luncy Pulp Co., 139 F·. 546, 71 C. C. A. 530.
In 14 C. J., Sec. 21, page 61, the law is stated
thus: 'The abstraction of the corporate entity
should never be allowed to bar out and prevent
the real and obvious truth'."
It was certainly apparent from the facts disclosed

at the hearing that Dale Grant, as well as O'Neil and
Snyder, used the corporate entity as a channel through
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which they might conduct their personal business. The
transcript shows that it was O'Neil and Grant who
made the contributions in money and other property
to the corporation which enabled it to commence its
operation, yet the record is entirely silent as to any
stock ownership in O'Neil. On the other hand the record
is silent as to any contribution other stockholders, members of Grant's family, made in consideration for their
stoek.
The ease of Ge;ary vs. Cain, 79 Utah 268, 9 P. 2d
396, involved a case of family ownership of the shares
of a corporation and an attempt to disregard the corporate entity and hold the individuals liable. The Court
at page 273 stated:
"A showing that Cain owns all, or substantially all, of the outstanding shares of the Doris
Trust Company, or that the persons in whose
names they stand hold the same in trust for him,
is vital to the plaintiff's ease under her first
theory. Courts of equity and courts of law as
well, and courts which administer both law and
equity in the same action, as do the courts of
this state, will, to prevent fraud and accomplish
justice, in proper cases ignore the legal fiction
that a corporation is a person separate and distinct from the person or group of persons who
own its stock. Western Securities Co. vs. Spiro,
62 Utah 62:3, 221 P. 85·6 ; D. I. Felsenthal Oo. vs.
Northern Assurance Co., 284 Ill. 343, 120 N.E. 268,
1 ALR 602, and annotation on page 610. It is
this doctrine which the plaintiff would have us
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ing that all other necessary facts appear, if Gain
in fact ·owned the stock or if his three children
who appear to own the shares, were shown to be
mere trustees for him in the ownership thereof.
But otherwise such doctrine can have no application. The corporate entity cannot be ignored
where, as here appears, the stock is owned by the
-children, and it does not appear that they hold
title to the shares in trust for their father. (Citing cases.) The doctrine is generally applied by
the courts when they have to deal with what in -colloquial language are called 'one man' corporations. It is not necessarily applied when they are
dealing with what are called 'family' corporations. The corporation whose affairs were involved in Western Securities Co. vs. Spiro, supra,
is typical of the former kind; the one involved
in Elenkrieg vs. Siebrecht is typical of the latter.
The doctrine simply means that the courts, ignoring forms and looking to the substance of things,
will regard the stockholders of a corporation as
the owners of its property, or as the real parties
in interest, whenever it is necessary to do ·so to
prevent a fraud which might otherwise be perpetrated, to redress a wrong which might otherwise
go without redress, or to do justice which might
otherwise fail."
In the Cain case, the children owned all but one
share of the corporation stock, and it did not appear
from the evidence that the shares were held in trust
for the defendant, Addison Cain. It is submitted that
in the instant case the stock distribution, coupled with
the facts set forth above, present sufficient grounds.
for the Court to "ignore the form and look to the sub-
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stance of things" and "regard the stockholder (in this
case Grant) as the owner of its property or as the real
party in interest, in order to prevent a fraud which might
otherwise he perpetrated."
It should he kept in mind that the discretion of the
court is, to a great extent, applied in the matter of
disregarding the corporate entity. As stated in the case of
Scola vs. IJ![ errill, 91 Utah 253, 301; 64 P. 2d 185, "There
should and must he as much elasticity in the application
of that principle as there is ingenuity in the attempts
to prostitute the fiction to the accomplishment of wrongful purposes. Each case must be determined upon its
own facts." It is further submitted that the Trial Court,
having an opportunity to appraise the witnesses before
it at the trial, could discern from their demeanor, as
well as from their response to questions asked, whether
they were telling the truth regarding the transactions.
Finally, the plaintiff need not rely on the finding
by the T'rial Court that Utah Cash Register Exchange,
Inc. was the alter ego of Dale E. Grant in order to support the judgment against Grant personally. Snyder
testified for plaintiff that Grant was indebted to O'Neil
in December of 1954 in the amount of $3,020.00, which
sum "represents the money that O'Neil gave Mr. Grant
to pay off a certain mortgage, chattel mortgage at
Farmers State Bank" (italics ours). The loan of money
was presumably to Grant personally, there appearing
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no promissory note to clarify whether the lmm

~~T<l ~

made to Grant or to the corporate entity. A notion of
the way in which Grant himself treated the money loaned
by O'Neil is revealed at page 77 of the transcript where
Gran't makes the statement, "He loaned me some money
at the start of my organization, and the object I think
that he, O'Neil, had was to provide himself with some
form of employment or commission basis, that I told
him he could work on commission if he wished, and
provide a j·ob" (italics ours).
CONCLUSION
It is anything hut true that the procedure followed
in the instant case illustrated "an attempt by plaintiff's
counsel to dispense with court procedure as some necessary evil to he dispensed with by sleight of hand."
When the entire record and transcript are studied, it
becomes apparent that the defendants were given notice
of the hearing and substantial information concerning
what was to transpire at the hearing in order to afford
them due process. The Court had jurisdiction over the
proceeding and heard the testimony of witnesses for
both sides and ruled on the matter after hearing arguments of counsel. The entire picture presented at the
hearing was one of an attempt at evasion of the Bulk
Sales Law of Utah coupled with an attempt by O'Neil
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and Grant, et al, to conceal from O'Neil's creditors the
assets of the A-1 Typewriter Stores in Salt Lake eity
and Provo. As the Trial Court remarked after awarding judgment against Grant for the benefit of Remington
Rand, Inc., "When you play with fire, you're apt to get
burned."
Respectfully submitted,
SKEEN, T:HURMAN,
WORSLE'Y & SNOW and
ALLEN M. SWAN,

Attorneys for Respondent,
1501 Walker Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, U tall
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